Related Posts that I read:
Context
Just to make sure we talk about the same type of Zombie, here is the SEP definition:
Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike the ones in films or witchcraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness.
From my interpretation of the descriptions of individuals with specific types of brain damage (see the example in the next paragraph), it seems that in some cases part of the movie of consciousness could be missing.
In the case of Hemispatial Neglect (but also many others), and related paper there may not be conscious visual experience but the remaining processing may occur, completely or partially.
Claim
A subject may not have some conscious experiences, but in all cases this is correlated* to spongy brain modules and interconnections to other modules. Missing modules can even correlate specifically to the visual experience / qualia.
If experience is dependent upon these visual modules in the brain, how could a zombie exist ?
There may still be zombies unlike us: individuals that may not have a subjective experience, at least with respect to some specific modality.
At the same time, this would contradict (to my understanding at least) Delusionism.
Question
- Is then the concept of a Zombie a useful thought experiment, or actually misleading ? Why or why not ?
*: there is an explanatory gap for a materialistic explanation